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What is essential in phenomenology does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical 
'movement' ('Richtung'). Higher than actuality stands possibility (1). 
Martin Heidegger, 
Being and Time 
Phenomenology is a method for studying experience. I employ this method in my 
research because it provides a first-person voice for the dancer, the choreographer, and 
the teacher/therapist in me. Oddly enough, the critic in all of us already uses a first- 
person voice when describing and interpreting the dance from our immediate experi- 
ence of it, and telling others what we think about it. Written criticism formalizes the 
critic's sensate proximity to the dance. But what about the voice of the dancer in valuing 
the experience of dance, and the consciousness of the choreographer in making the 
dance? Where are they accounted for in the formulas for dance research and writing? 
The objective third-person voice necessary to a particular historical or social angle is 
more common. Phenomenology has given me a method for intuitive and theoretical 
reflections on dance from multiple perspectives. Eventually, I contextualize these within 
the larger framework of phenomenology as a branch of modem philosophy. 
I began to write using the tools of phenomenology in 1970 when I became 
aware that aesthetic discourse on dance was distanced from the actual experience, and 
that the writers in dance aesthetics, with the notable exception of Susanne Langer, were 
mostly men. I wanted to use an embodied voice and to see if a woman in dance might 
add to the field of phenomenology. My interests eventually led me to developmental 
psychology, a field that has much in common with phenomenology (2). Maxine Sheets- 
Johnstone had already broken the ice in The Phenomenology of Dance, but she had 
written more analytically than descriptively, clarifying the formative (creative) basis of 
dance with values intrinsically located in the moving self (3). I built upon this, but I 
wanted to weave the intuitive voice of the dancer into a descriptive aesthetics, slipping 
from the first-person experiential voice to analytical third-person theory, as phenom- 
enology does. These were the goals of my descriptive aesthetics: Dance and the Lived 
Body (1987) (4). Later I began to explain phenomenology as a research method for 
dance in my article for Dance Research Journal, "A Vulnerable Glance: Seeing Dance 
Through Phenomenology" (1991); and in "Witnessing the Frog Pond" (1999), I devel- 
oped this more explicitly (5). 
My recent work-in-progress, When We Dance, is influenced by the philosophy of 
phenomenologists who are opening up new vistas of organic being, mapping our way 
back to our body, our body back into the natural world. These include Bruce Wilshire's 
Wild Hunger (1998), which probes the primal roots of modem addictions, demonstrat- 
ing the necessity of joy in the body; The Imperative (1998), by Alphonso Lingis, whose 
new phenomenology of perception illuminates the exquisite order of the world around 
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and within us and the compelling imperative in our relationship to nature; and David 
Abram's Spell of the Sensuous (1996), which revises dualist thinking about the place of 
humans in the world and generates a lyrical humanism for the 21st century (6). Like 
these authors, my work seeks to heal our bodily rupture with nature and revalue the 
darkness mythically associated with nature and woman but through the voices and 
workings of dancers. 
Today phenomenology has a more confident reach into consciousness than ever 
before as it extends into cognitive science, neuroscience, and developmental psychol- 
ogy with new understandings of how science and philosophy can blend (7). Linguistic 
and political concerns (8), and the artificial intelligence of cyberspace, also influence 
new applications of phenomenology. Sheets Johnstone articulates her feminist/phenom- 
enological critique in The Roots of Power; in The Primacy of Movement she produces a 
comprehensive phenomenology of movement and natural history (9). Recent scientific 
advances in the research of Candace Pert and others are demonstrating the biomolecular 
basis for human emotion, proving that traditional divisions of body/mind are false, as 
has been the nondualistic basis of phenomenology in its concept of "the lived body" 
(10). Similarly, the neuroscience of Antonio Damasio is validating accounts of con- 
sciousness that relate body, self, mind, and emotion, also refuting traditional dualisms. 
He links his work to philosophy through Susanne Langer (a disciple of Alfred North 
Whitehead) and to developmental psychology through Daniel Ster (11). 
I am concerned for the future of our field that dance research not be dictated 
solely by objective distance and quantification. Dance is not a scientific field even if it 
does employ various sciences to many good purposes. We should not lose the mystery 
and magic of dance, the anima mundi of our body in its continuity with nature, culture, 
and community. Phenomenology seeks the intangible obvious, that which lies before 
our eyes and in our hearts however obscured through habit, even as its existential 
conscience (a form of intelligence newly defined by Howard Gardner) reminds us that 
innocence, the river of our body's memory, is not naivete. 
To arouse the study of experience, from the innocence of spontaneous dancing 
to the most complicated choreographies imaginable, I suggest three related possibilities 
for developing phenomenology in the dance research of the future: 
* The validation of personal and shared experiences, as we learn how to voice the 
dance and somatosensory experience from what Damasio calls "the feeling of what 
happens." I provide some examples in the next section of this essay. 
* Dancing as a way of knowing that brackets body-mind integrity as the descriptive 
essence of phenomenology provides a basis for self understanding. Here it will be 
important to keep current on studies that extend our understanding of consciousness, 
cognition, and kinesthetics. 
* How our human consciousness links us to the nonhuman world, as we seek to mend 
the destructive nature/culture split. The neurological studies of Damasio on conscious- 
ness (not exclusively human, as he holds); the extensive work of Sheets-Johnstone on 
the primacy of movement in the life-world; and the body ecology of Abram, Wilshire, 
and Lingis open up these possibilities. 
Phenomenology connects with hermeneutics in its concerns for linguistic interpre- 
tation, as made clear by Paul Ricoeur in his work on sign, symbolization, metaphor, and 
text (12). As cognate fields, they both aim toward a creative interaction between the 
reader and the text (or the audience, the dance, and the dancer). I give an example of 
how hermeneutics enters into phenomenology in the last section of this essay. 
I should clarify that phenomenology, even as it encourages the intuitive embodied 
voice, does not circumvent the problems of linguistics, aesthetics, history, and politics. 
Researchers and practitioners who continue to develop this method have an obligation 
to situate the experiential voice, accounting for what Edward Said has called "discrepant 
experiences," and in utilizing such conterpoint, to avoid essentializing views that are 
closed to the possibility of community (13). It would be possible, for instance, to 
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essentialize and isolate the voices of women (or ethnicities, or nations), without promot- 
ing the fuller knowledge they provide in overlapping other voices (even competing 
ones) in building community. Differentiation is important and so is integration; the first 
entails the ability to free oneself from social and genetic determinism, the second 
implies the individual's rapport with otherness, ancestry, nature, and communal vari- 
ance. Phenomenology does not rest on the uniqueness of experience. Its mission is to 
find the irreducibles of subjectivity, those affective connections humans have with each 
other and non-human nature as well. In the language of phenomenology, this is 
"intersubjectivity," our transcendence of self toward others and the world. I believe that 
the arts mark this transcendental core. 
I continue to shape my phenomenology through the many voices of dance and 
related voices of somatic movement practices. It can be read on various levels and has 
implications for researchers and critics as well as teachers and practitioners. In the short 
study below, I provide an example of how I use phenomenology to research the inter- 
section of dance with somatic/perceptual experience and to illustrate how language and 
movement can come together to express consciousness. Phenomenology has the task of 
studying embodied experience; thus my own first person voice enters into my own 
work. When I study classroom situations, I also incorporate the voices of students and 
ask them to describe their experience in writing-quickly and intuitively-not listening 
to their internal critics. As shown, I include their voices and interpret them much as I 
would my own. At this point phenomenology becomes a hermeneutic and shared 
exploration. It validates the personal voice, but in eliciting other voices, it works out- 
ward toward comparative knowledge, tangibly about the bodyself. The phenomenologi- 
cal method respects the identities that emerge through descriptive processes. Its notion 
of truth accommodates discordant voices, not seeking to level differences, looping 
through individuality toward similarity. My thumbnail sketch in three parts moves first 
into a phenomenological process, then weaves in descriptive examples, and finally 
extrapolates the hermeneutics that underlie the whole. The latter project owes a debt to 
"Dance in the Hermeneutic Circle," by Joann McNamara (14). I ask the reader to enter 
my investigations through a dream. 
I. Dancing the Dreambody 
My body lies over the ocean, my body lies over the sea.... 
When I began the Feldenkrais training program, I had an airplane dream. The plane was 
airborne, and I was not in my seat. Rather I was up and about, engaged in a most 
curious activity-putting bodies in overhead bins. Now these were not dead bodies; 
they were fellow passengers, and it wasn't easy. I had to lift them up and stuff them in, 
then close the bins. I had no clue as to the meaning of this dream, but it was very vivid, 
and I remembered this part of it the next day while I was being given a functional 
integration lesson by one of the assistant teachers in my training program. As I lay on 
my side on the bodywork table, the teacher began to contact the pattern of my breath 
with her hands; this increased my comfort, immediately propelling me into a deep state 
of relaxed awareness. Finally I was aware of the soft rolling of my head in the teacher's 
hands, its finely tuned articulations with the vertebra of my neck, and how the clavicle 
and shoulders carried the nuanced intentions of the head-rolling into my arms and 
hands. 
The bodies, and the dream, came back to me as the teacher brought me up off the 
table. My eyes filled with tears, and I suddenly realized that the bodies I was putting in 
bins were my own selves in several guises. I had been "putting myself on a shelf' so to 
speak; waiting-so it seemed-for something (maybe the future); tucking my body, 
myself, away that I might later take it down from the shelf for something more impor- 
tant, more deserved. For free unfettered time after the real tasks of my endless jobs were 
complete? For retirement? How, I wondered, as I realized this deferential relationship 
my body had developed with my mind (mind over baggage), could I give myself the 
56 Dance Research Journal 32/1 (Summer 2000) 
attention I deserved, the pleasure of being present to myself that I realized through the 
meaning of my dream? Somatic explorations through touch to facilitate functional, 
elegant, and spacious movement can bring us back to our bodies-our bodies back to 
our minds (15). 
It is significant that the dualism this journey suggests is both metaphysical and 
phenomenological; that is, there is no justification for thinking of the body and mind as 
separate or separable entities in the first place, as Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of 
Perception (16) and subsequent body-mind philosophy have shown. But we also 
recognize an experienced duality that commonly arises when we objectify the body as a 
thing, ignoring our subjective flesh, whether lively and sportive or profoundly in 
absentia. We can and we do objectify the body as material substance with physical 
characteristics, but we know even as we do this that mind has a physical, bodily basis. 
Our body thinks, and it thinks as it moves (17). In other words, our moving, living body 
is intelligent, and our thinking arises through material physical sources as surely as it 
may seem to move beyond them. When we trust our innate intelligence, it speaks, or 
brings us images and feelings in unpredictable ways. This is furthermore a healing 
intelligence. Another name for it is "subconscious mind," the intelligence that Carl Jung 
calls our dreambody, the inexhaustible resource that can move us toward our larger 
mind in lines of least resistance. It can solve problems that our limited mind in its 
habitual patterns cannot; the dreambody can bring our larger mind to the surface and 
make it available to consciousness. This can happen when we quiet the will and relax 
the mind in somatically focused bodywork and dance improvisations. Following 
Damasio's work on the relationship between core consciousness and extended con- 
sciousness (18), I believe that dancing (along with healing) originates at an intrinsic 
level of somatosensory awareness (core consciousness), and when facilitated in a 
supportive environment, movement images and aesthetic appreciation can grow from 
there, as we learn how to pay attention to our body-self at subtle levels and eventually 
express our knowledge in various verbal and nonverbal forms (or as "extended con- 
sciousness"). 
Carson (I will call him), a student in one of my somatics classes, wrote about his 
somatosensory awareness, and he has given me permission to quote him (as have other 
students whose descriptions are represented later): 
When we did our first sensory awareness exploration, I had the sensation 
that my body was floating. It was a strange feeling; it seemed as if my 
skin had melted away and I was floating without an outer covering. 
As class work progressed over the semester, Carson became more adept at moving his 
consciousness through various bodily states, even exploring the painful lumbar region 
of his spine and identifying places that were numb to his awareness. Eventually he read 
about sensorimotor amnesia in long-term stress conditions in the work of Thomas 
Hanna (19). Carson learned how to use gentle movement patterns performed without 
stress and goal orientation (motivated by somatically conceived yoga, the Feldenkrais 
Method, and the Alexander Technique) to ease the pain of his back and pelvis. He 
reported in his journal that he learned how to release the tension and to ease the memo- 
ries held in the pain. Bringing body to mind, he describes aspects of his somatic/ 
perceptual awareness: 
I discover a gateway to my inner self, peeling away the layers of outer 
skin and physical boundaries, but I do not feel naked. I become one with 
myself and the human soma, self-regulating as well as self-sensing. My 
perception of my outer body is quite different from my inward body. It 
seems as if my body is an unexplored, uninhabited island, and I am 
exploring it for the first time. 
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Carson's response does not necessarily mean that there are two bodies-an inner and an 
outer. Dualism is a matter of consciousness. On the sensory level, our body-self is 
organically whole, a participatory landscape of unwritten languages waiting to speak 
our stories in the quiet air of dreams and dancing. Carson, who had been a professional 
dancer, was going behind his habitual body to discover a source for new options in 
dance and to heal. 
Through dancing and somatic bodywork, I have also experienced the surfacing of 
this healing landscape, that aspect of my core self that I have come to trust as mythic 
and creative. Many times it has been a source of solace and insight, as I have moved 
behind the technical patterns of dance to explore spontaneously arising movement, to 
let the dance happen in its own way and its own time. When I reach optimal points in 
dancing, or as I move with others therapeutically, I feel connected to the natural world 
in a special way. No words are needed to communicate, but at the same time when they 
come, they are welcome. Articulating an experience, painting it, or somehow putting it 
in another medium can reinforce the experience. Nothing serves to replace it, however, 
the experience itself is intrinsically valuable. The therapeutic does not lie in the interpre- 
tation, rather it exists in tangible changes: laughter, tears, a fuller breath, more 
self-confidence, improved alignment, a smoother walk, a more complete body image, 
less pain, feelings of peace and wholeness, dancing better. 
II. Intrinsic Dance: Body-for-self 
Intrinsic dance is the pleasure we feel in our bodies when we are in our own flow of 
being (20), moving for the dance and not to please others (or lose weight), a matter of 
consciousness. I explore this phenomenon descriptively in the dance of walking: 
I love to walk when the sun is high and hot and there is just enough 
breeze to ruffle my coiled sarong, soft against my legs, just enough to 
stir the chartreuse leaves in metallic music against the sky. Walking 
arouses a gratitude in me, for the kid practicing his saxophone as I pass 
by, for the gathering experience of the day passing brightly, for those 
whose radiance I have never doubted. 
If I pay attention to the poetry of my body, it brings home with insight the desire to take 
care of myself and take responsibility: 
I love to twist my spine. As a vertebrate, I respect the diamond chain of 
it, how it bends and extends exquisitely, even in the poverty of my 
illnesses, and how its nebulous brilliance writhes as I move-its crystal 
being bone-white and right, not so winding, then suddenly dodging 
everywhere, its intelligence round rocks in the river. 
"Today," a student wrote in her somatics journal, "I experienced something wonderful!" 
Her description of the experience develops an explanatory phenomenology: 
We spent a great deal of time working on each other's movement, guiding it 
with our hands, especially in the area of the scapula, clavicle, and shoulder. I 
could feel small things occurring in my body as my partner guided me through 
subtle movement in a gentle manner. When my partner directed her energies 
in a lift up through the back of my neck, I immediately felt a great release in 
the muscles. As I began to walk, I felt taller than I have ever felt in recent 
memory, and the tallness was something my body had just done on its own 
without me trying to make it happen. It took only a slight suggestion of 
movement for this to occur, but my body had been prepared. It seemed to 
know how to go there. 
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"My body used to live somewhere else in the mirror," a dance student wrote of her 
growing awareness of her body-self: 
I lived in the response to my body from others, detached in the clouds, 
in the physicality I was so shy of. Now my body lives within me, I have 
called it to me. My body is beautiful. 
Another student describes a somatics partnering session: 
Alice was working with me. We were slowly walking around the room 
and she was watching me from behind. As she gently and silently 
entered my personal space, I began to feel a warm, enfolding sense of 
security and support. I instantly began to cry because this is the feeling 
that is constantly missing from my life. For the first time, I truly realized 
how much the physical can affect thought and feeling. 
III. Theoretical Framework 
Now, I frame the foregoing matters of consciousness on two philosophical levels: the 
first concerns the structure of consciousness inherent in phenomenological descriptions, 
and the second, their hermeneutic function as constituting the second level of phenom- 
enology-the attempt to come to an understanding that bridges the "sense" level of 
description with the fuller context of our "being-in-the-world." Both levels can inform 
researchers as they study their own experience and that of others, and also teachers who 
automatically engage hermeneutics when they interpret the experiential accounts of 
their students. Dance processes can be explained on these philosophical levels, as well. 
I interpret and situate my experiences and those of my students in the context of particu- 
lar studies where they provide concrete examples of the theory I am trying to bring to 
life. As a teacher, I can also use the intuitively derived descriptions of students to help 
them make a link between their sense of themselves as movers with their ability to make 
or perform a dance. 
Level L Descriptive Structures: Intuitive description is the first level of the phe- 
nomenological method. It seeks what lies behind mimesis in its various functions. 
Consciousness is asked to speak directly and not to mirror itself, mime, or perform. A 
performance is consciousness of another sort, lived twice. That is: there is the original 
utterance or movement (as in dance improvisation), and then there is the performance of 
that utterance or movement (conscious replication as we represent choreographically the 
spontaneous movement). Here skill enters in; recall, repetition, and reformulation help 
to reinforce the original phenomenon as it sediments in consciousness. 
The descriptions of consciousness that come and go in this short study stem from 
attempts toward original naming of essences-that which appears most immediately to 
consciousness. As an aspect of this phenomenon, we see that consciousness also taps 
into subliminal matters (21). The reader will notice that however much the descriptions 
differ in context and style, they do function as accounts of consciousness, more particu- 
larly "what matters" in the moment of the description, as the writer draws up (as from a 
well) striking aspects of an experience. 
Level II. Hermeneutics: At the interpretive level, phenomenology moves toward 
hermeneutics. This movement (of consciousness) is apparent in the foregoing study 
where we are coming to understand what has been discovered through the descriptive 
process-what the experience itself has uncovered. Thus, the original sense, which is 
improvisatory, informs the evolution of interpretation, a rendering of meaning derived 
from the lived experience. This cycle can be further formulated and expressed in many 
modes: through narrative, poetry, visual art, in music, or in theater and dance as matters 
of consciousness are made visible, audible, and kinesthetically explicit. This happens in 
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research, where new meaning is discovered through textual connections, and in the 
translations of dancing, as movement is made meaningful. Here I am explaining how 
interpretation is based in experience, just as it is the task of hermeneutics to do this. 
Phenomenological description aims toward original, intuitive description of sense 
experience, the body-mind axis of our lived experience. It precedes and interacts with 
interpretation like the translation of sense into meaningful form in the arts, and it also 
informs philosophical theory, as in the present case. Meaning (as in "I understand what 
this experience means") can be derived rather quickly and intuitively, just as we see 
meaning emerge in the foregoing experiential descriptions, ranging from snapshots to 
short story accounts of consciousness. Supporting a theory involves analysis and takes 
more time. Phenomenological descriptions embody two levels of intuition then: sense 
and meaning. They may also support theory as data for the study of consciousness. It is 
of significance to the various fields of movement studies that we can make the leap 
from sense to meaning through movement, whether conceived through somatic explora- 
tions or in the various processes of dancing. 
For me, as for many phenomenologists, there is a poetics involved in hermeneu- 
tics, but straightforward explanations of sense impressions also inform understanding. 
Poetics and explanatory demonstrations (verbal and nonverbal) introduce second-level 
descriptions: they perform sense impressions as they re-present them through assimila- 
tion. Poetic and explanatory demonstrations of experiential affective phenomena bring 
to our attention the connections they have assimilated by representing in an intelligible 
form the original intuition, what Heidegger called the "leap" or "ursprung," and in his 
full system, "the origin of the work of art" (22). This poiesis (the poetic-demonstrative 
process) provides the very possibility of human history, to extend Heidegger's aesthetic 
system and return to his definition of phenomenology quoted at the beginning of this 
essay. 
At the intrinsic experiential level, somatic movement explorations and dance are 
related: This is what the heart of my analysis has taught me. I have also discovered a 
tangential matter that will lead me to future investigations: Dance improvisation is a 
first-level sense descriptive where possibility transfigures action in the expansiveness of 
present time; choreography then involves us in the hermeneutic circle of the second 
level of the dance phenomenon. Bringing this possibility to words and sentences creates 
the context for narrative and poetry; risking ourselves in movement permits the dawning 
of a second sight-from the personal-therapeutic intrinsic dance to the aesthetic-cultural 
projections of theater dance. Matters of consciousness bridging descriptive language 
and movement can be made legible; this is the theory I have tried to demonstrate in this 
study. Intuition has guided my thought-and the blind faith that I might be able to show 
that consciousness matters. 
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